Belonging without Othering: How We Save Ourselves and the World
john a. powell & Stephen Menendian
448 pages, Stanford University Press, 2024
Most of us are familiar with the notion of belonging. We can point to places or times in our lives where we have felt it (or, more painfully, felt its absence). There is a common-sense definition and intuitive understanding of the term, like many important ideas (such as “democracy” or “equality”), our superficial sense of it tends to obscure hidden depths. And its subjective and ephemeral nature hampers efforts to understand belonging, as well as how to cultivate and institutionalize it. Like “happiness” (and to the frustration of those who study and try to define it), belonging can exist in one context and disappear in the next, only to reemerge a moment later, based upon a symbol, a message, or a social cue. It may be fleeting or enduring, but it is always powerful and often highly sought after.
Drawn from years of research, this excerpt from Belonging without Othering: How We Save Ourselves and the World is our best attempt to define belonging in clear and concise terms, and to clarify the essential elements of any fulsome and meaningful expression, whether it is in a place of work, an educational setting, or a community context. These elements are necessary, although not necessarily sufficient, to make belonging manifest in the world, in the workplace, or in places of worship and play.
Like equality, achieving a broadly inclusive state of belonging (a world where everyone belongs) may be only ever an aspiration, but it is one that can shape our world for the better, even if only in pursuit. We may never perfectly reach the utopia or nirvana of a world of belonging without othering, but we can certainly aim for that goal. And in so doing, we will have achieved much and averted even more.—Stephen Menendian
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Like many important ideas, belonging is a complex, multifaceted, and multidimensional concept. It is also dynamic, meaning that it can exist in one context but disappear in another, or appear and reappear in the same context over time. For decades, scholars have sought to define belonging and decode the elements that appear to constitute it. One of the classic definitions is the “satisfaction of an individual’s need to be personally involved with their environment and to feel part of a larger social entity—socially embedded.” More recent definitions, often emphasizing different elements, have been propounded. In many ways, these efforts are similar to the efforts to measure and define “happiness,” which is also a highly subjective experience and eludes a specific and singular definition.
In lieu of agreement upon a specific definition for belonging, scholars have instead developed—and sought to validate—a series of scales capable of measuring belonging. One of the first, and probably the best-known of these instruments, is the “Sense of Belonging Instrument” (SOBI), published in 1995. The SOBI is a long questionnaire (a 27-item survey with 49 questions) divided into two parts, “psychological states” and “antecedents.” This instrument has been widely applied in a variety of contexts. But that has hardly slowed the creation of new measures. Intervening research and additional efforts have produced new scales and instruments, with their authors touting their advantages over the alternatives.
Despite these impressive efforts, there remain many limitations to and criticisms of these instruments. Even if these instruments maintain predictive validity, that does not mean that they are capturing or illuminating the elements that constitute belonging. Paradoxically, they may be successful at predicting
or measuring belonging, but fail as operational definitions or at generating such definitions.
Moreover, as the names of these instruments suggest, they are focused on a sense
of belonging, and have limited ability to tell us why belonging is experienced or what sorts of conditions, traits, or interactions help generate that sense. By focusing on the respondent’s personality, identity, or dispositional traits, many of these instruments fail to document or identify the contextual or situational factors that could provide further illumination on the material conditions that shape the experience of belonging.
Further research has sought to unpack different dimensions to belonging, with different researchers arguing for or against different components. For example, some emphasize the dimension of “connectedness,” while others might emphasize “participation” or “recognition.” It is not our goal to resolve these debates here. Given the variety of circumstances in which belonging may be desired, it is possible that there is no comprehensive or complete set of elements sufficient to create or foster belonging in every possible context. Nonetheless, we can specify a few elements that may be necessary to belonging irrespective of context and a few related fundamental insights along the way.
In terms of general principles, first, we maintain that belonging is a compound concept, which incorporates multiple elements and/or dimensions. To the frustration of many, like other important compound or complex concepts, it is not reducible to a simple proxy or singular element, even “fit” or “feeling of home.” Second, belonging is a relational concept, which means that it cannot be understood in a reductive, analytic mode of examining individuals or their psychological traits or attitudinal tendencies. We must examine the relationship itself, not simply the things that are in relationship. Third, and relatedly, belonging is both subjective and objective.1
As a concept measured by self-report, belonging may ultimately be subjective (existing or not according to subjective experience), but it nonetheless has a material substrate. This is a point we wish to emphasize: there exist socio-ecological preconditions that make the experience of belonging more or less likely. Thus, like othering, belonging is structured and patterned in society, not simply the experience of individuals. In general, the psychological instruments that measure belonging give insufficient attention to these conditions. To the extent that these preconditions are functionally “necessary conditions,” whose absence makes belonging either impossible or extremely unlikely, we feel comfortable including them as definitional elements.
In terms of elements, we contend that, first, belonging encompasses and requires inclusion, and to some extent equity as well. This is part of the objective aspect to belonging. If extreme disparities persist or exclusion is maintained, then the conditions for belonging cannot arise or exist. Belonging may also require accommodation.2 Norms, customs, or practices that are designed to be neutral, but have a persistent disparate impact, undermine belonging. If an institution, for example, provides food options that fail to recognize certain religious or dietary needs, then members of some groups may be or feel excluded. Similarly, if building design or other physical structures impede access for people with disabilities, then exclusion can occur even if formal inclusion is the policy. These and other examples are discussed in more detail later in our book.
Second, belonging requires a sense of connection, with an emphasis on sense. Whether we wish it or not, most things exist in some sort of dynamic relationship, and belonging is no exception. The experience of belonging is more likely when there is a tether or a tie, something that binds or affiliates a person to another person, community, group, or institution. That connection need not be intimate; nor must it be permanent. But the absence of a sense of connection is unlikely to generate a sense of belonging. This is part of the subjective aspect of belonging.
Furthermore, this connection generally comes with an emotional valance, often a sense of attachment, fondness, safety, or warmth. This is what is meant by an “affective” component to belonging that is not generally acknowledged or emphasized in other equity and inclusion practices, even those that stress representation. The affective element describes how individuals regard or feel about the object of belonging. This affective component cannot be known by simply scanning formal policies or objective conditions, but only by investigating the sense of connection itself.
Third, belonging requires visibility or recognition. The simple act of being seen can engender powerful feelings between people, even a sense of intimacy between erstwhile strangers. In the public sphere, people yearn to be heard and understood, especially if they feel neglected or overlooked. Recognition occurs when people feel that their social group is seen, respected, and valued. This is partly why representation is so important: if a person feels that their identity or their group is invisible in the community or institution, they are less likely to feel a sense of belonging. A feeling of belonging is fostered when a community or an institution affirmatively communicates that participants belong, and does so in a way that demonstrates that the community or institution sees and respects their identities.
Recognition may form the predicate for a sense of connection, which then becomes a reciprocal element: the subjective experience of belonging is more likely if the connection is in some way mutual, if the person holding the connection to the community, institution, or group simultaneously feels that they are visible, recognized, and valued. The sense of connection may be a by-product of feeling recognized and valued.
Mixed messages or subtle cues can undermine efforts to engender belonging. If the message feels more like a marketing slogan than an authentic expression of intent, it could weaken attachments rather than engender belonging. Such messaging should be grounded programmatically. It should resonate in the life of an institution.
Fourth, belonging requires agency. Agency is the sense or feeling of control people have over actions and their consequences. Belonging requires a meaningful degree of actual agency in relation to the object of belonging. If barriers are removed, objective disparities are eliminated or reduced, recognition is accorded, and connection is forged, but agency is denied, then belonging is unlikely exist. Or if inclusion occurs, but some participants are given a voice and a say, but others are denied it, then belonging is thwarted for those who are treated less generously.
The requisite of agency brings power into the belonging formula. To have agency, one must individually and collectively have the power to act and the potential to influence. This goes beyond the classic formulation of “voice.” Having a voice means being heard, which is largely a corollary to being recognized or visible, our third definitional element. Agency goes beyond voice to “say,” or influence. Having a say does not necessarily mean getting one’s way, but it does entail more than the right to be heard; it means some degree of capacity to shape the proceedings or the deliberations. To foster belonging, we call for the empowerment of people, especially those from marginalized groups, to be able to fully participate in society. Belonging will arise when institutions and communities take steps to facilitate agency so that these participants ultimately feel that they have a say.